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ABSTRACT
Deploying and serving deep learning (DL) models in the public
cloud facilitates the process to bootstrap artificial intelligence (AI)
services. Yet, preserving the confidentiality of sensitive input data
remains a concern to most service users. Accidental disclosures
of user input data may breach increasingly stringent data protec-
tion regulations and inflict reputation damage. In this paper, we
systematically investigate the life cycles of input data in deep learn-
ing image classification pipelines and further identify the potential
places for information disclosures. Based on the discovered insights,
we build YerbaBuena, an enclave-based model serving system to
protect the confidentiality and integrity of user input data. To ac-
commodate the performance and capacity limitations of today’s
enclave technology, we employ a Ternary Model Partitioning strat-
egy that allows service users to securely partition their proprietary
DL models on local machines. Therefore, we can (I) enclose sensi-
tive computation in a secure enclave to mitigate input information
disclosures and (II) delegate non-sensitive workloads to run out of
enclave with hardware-assisted DL acceleration. Our comprehen-
sive partitioning analysis and workload measurement demonstrate
how users can automatically determine the optimal partitioning
for their models, thus to maximize confidentiality guarantees with
low performance costs.
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1 INTRODUCTION
It is convenient to leverage public cloud platforms to serve deep
learning (DL) models. Service users can deploy their pre-trained
proprietary DLmodels, in the form of deep neural networks (DNNs),
to serve prediction requests. Customized prediction APIs can be
exposed to be further integrated into mobile or desktop applications.
However, deploying and serving DL models in public clouds
continues to pose security and privacy challenges. DL systems
often process large amounts of user input data and depend on the
latest innovations in hardware acceleration. Although users expect
cloud providers to be trustworthy and dependable, they still remain
cautious about the confidentiality of their input data. Accidental
disclosures of private user data may violate increasingly stricter
data protection regulations and lead to reputation damage.
To address the data confidentiality problem for deploying models
in a third-party cloud, researchers proposed approaches based on
cryptographic primitives[13, 32, 37] to enable privacy-preserving
predictions. Although significant performance improvements have
been made, these approaches are still not practical to be deployed
in production environments. Distributed machine learning has also
been proposed to protect data confidentiality[30, 36, 39, 43]. There,
part of the deep learning functionality is delegated to the clients
and private data are retained on client machines. However, these
approaches introduced additional complexities to the client-side
program logic; they also required more computing power on client
devices, which are typically resource constrained.
As an alternative, Ohrimenko et al.[38] presented data-oblivious
multi-party machine learning algorithms and leveraged Intel Soft-
ware Guard Extensions (SGX) to make them privacy-preserving.
Recent research efforts, such as Chiron[22] and Myelin[23], aim to
enable SGX enclave integration for machine learning as a service
(MLaaS). However, SGX-based computation is currently perfor-
mance and memory constrained. Specifically, in-enclave workloads
cannot exploit DL accelerators for matrix computation and floating-
point arithmetic. It also has a limit of 128MB protected physical
memory size for Intel Skylake CPUs1. This, in turn, makes SGX in-
adequate to efficiently support running a deep and complex neural
network entirely within an enclave.
To address the performance and capacity limitations of secure
enclaves, it is essential to partition the deep learning workloads and
delegate as much computation as possible to run out of enclaves.
However, insecure model partitioning strategies may lead to infor-
mation disclosures of the original inputs. Adversaries may leverage
the out-of-enclave DL workloads, including both the partial model
parameters and the computed outputs, to reconstruct or reveal the
properties of the inputs.
In this paper, we systematically investigate the life cycles of input
data in deep learning image classifiers and identify the potential
places for information disclosures. Based on the discovered insights,
we employ a Ternary Model Partitioning strategy to tightly control
both ends, i.e., data entrance and exit, of deep learning inference
pipelines to mitigate information leakages.
Our research prototype consists of two co-operative systems run-
ning respectively on users’ local machines and in the public cloud.
(I) On the user side, we build a Neural Network Assessment Frame-
work to automate the process of evaluating and partitioning their
proprietary DL models. Service users can leverage this framework
to conduct local model partitioning before deploying the models
to the cloud. (II) On the cloud side, we develop YerbaBuena, an
enclave-based model serving system to host user-provisioned mod-
els and instantiate online image classification services. We leverage
1With memory paging support for Linux SGX kernel driver, the size of enclave memory
can be expanded with memory swapping. But swapping on the encrypted memory
will significantly affect the performance.
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Intel SGX to enforce isolated execution with memory access control
and encryption protection. By enclosing the sensitive DL workload
partitions into a secure enclave and enforcing authenticated en-
cryption at data entrance, we can effectively prevent adversaries
from exploiting Input Reconstruction [9, 33] or Model Interpreta-
tion [2, 42, 45, 46] techniques to divulge sensitive information of the
original inputs. At the same time, we can still delegate non-sensitive
workloads to run out of enclave to benefit from hardware-assisted
DL acceleration.
We have conducted partitioning experiments on a spectrum of
ImageNet-level DNNs with different network depths and archi-
tectural complexity, e.g., from the Darknet Reference Model (17
layers), Extraction Model (28 layers), to the deeper and more com-
plex DenseNet Model (306 layers)[21]. Our comprehensive security
analysis and workload measurement can be used as a guideline
for service users to determine their own principle for partition-
ing DNNs, thus to achieve maximized security and performance
guarantees.
To summarize, the major contributions are as follows:
(1) A systematic study on the information disclosures of input
data in deep learning image classification pipelines;
(2) A Ternary Model Partitioning strategy derived from the
information disclosure analysis;
(3) A Neural Network Assessment Framework to automate the
local model partitioning process covering different DNN
architectures;
(4) An enclave-based deep learning model serving system to
protect the confidentiality and integrity of user input data.
Roadmap. First, we briefly introduce the background knowledge
in Section 2. Then, we motivate the research problem and derive
the security principles for our system in Section 3. Section 4 dis-
cusses the threat model. In Section 5, we present the Ternary Model
Partitioning strategy and the Neural Network Assessment Frame-
work. We describe the model serving system design in Section 6,
the implementation in Section 7, and the evaluation in Section 8.
Section 9 discusses our future work and Section 10 surveys the
related works. We conclude in Section 11.
2 BACKGROUND
In this section, we give a brief overview of two technologies that
are closely related to our work: deep learning and Intel SGX. Deep
learning is the key technology behind most state-of-the-art artifi-
cial intelligence (AI) services. We leverage Intel SGX as the Trusted
Execution Environment (TEE) in YerbaBuena to protect the confi-
dentiality of user input data in deep learning pipelines.
Deep Learning. Conventional machine learning methods are less
efficient for processing raw data. Building a machine learning sys-
tem required non-trivial domain expertise and engineering efforts
to transform raw data and extract feature representations. Deep
learning is an application of Artificial Neural Networks and is in
the family of Representation Learning. Deep learning methods can
process raw data directly and automatically discover the representa-
tions, with no human interventions. It can learn complex functions
by composing multiple non-linear modules to transform represen-
tations from low-level raw inputs to high-level abstractions.
The major component of any deep learning inference system is
a DNN, which has multiple hidden layers between the input and
output layers. Each layer contains multiple neurons. Each connec-
tion between two neurons in a DNN has an associated weight. In
supervised learning, the weights are learned in the training stage
by maximizing the objective function of a neural network. Gener-
ally, stochastic gradient descent (SGD) with back-propagation is
the most widely used approach for learning the weights of neural
networks.
Mathematically, a feedforward DNN can be defined as a rep-
resentation function F ∗ that maps an input x to an output y, i.e.,
y = F ∗(x;θ ). θ represents parameters that are learned during model
training. F ∗ is composed of n (assuming the network has n layers)
sub-functions Fi , where i ∈ [1,n]. Fi maps the input xi to the output
yi on layer i . These sub-functions are connected in a chain. Thus,
y = F ∗(x;θ ) = FnFn−1...F1(x). For a classification model, the final
output y is a probability vector generated by the softmax activation
function. The top-k entries are extracted from y and are mapped
with a set of user-defined class labels L.
In addition, we briefly discuss Convolutional Neural Networks
(ConvNets), which have achieved great success in computer vision
tasks, including detection, segmentation, and recognition of objects
in images and videos. ConvNet is a class of feedforward DNN
that is designed for processing data in multi-dimensional arrays.
Different from fully connected neural networks, the neurons in
each layer of a ConvNet are arranged in three dimensions: width,
height, and depth. Each neuron only connects to a receptive field
of a previous layer. There are a few distinct types of layers for
ConvNets, including convolutional layers and pooling layers. The
parameters of a convolutional layer consist of a set of learnable
filters. Each filter computes a dot product between their weights and
a receptive field it connects to in the input volume, thus producing
a 2-dimensional feature map. A convolutional layer usually uses
Rectified Linear Unit (ReLU) as its activation function. The output
volume of a convolutional layer is stacked feature maps along the
depth dimension. The pooling layers perform non-linear down-
sampling operations to reduce the dimensionality of the feature
maps. The convolutional and pooling layers in a ConvNet act as the
feature extractors for the input. ConvNets use the same softmax
activation function for classification, similar to a regular DNN.
Intel Software Guard Extensions. Intel SGX [35] offers a non-
hierarchical protection model to support secure computation on un-
trusted remote servers. SGX includes a set of new instructions and
memory protection mechanisms added to the Intel CPU architec-
ture. A user-level application can instantiate a hardware-protected
container, denoted as an enclave. An enclave resides in the applica-
tion’s address space and guarantees confidentiality and integrity
of the code and data within it. Privileged software, such as the hy-
pervisor, Basic Input/Output System (BIOS), System Management
Mode (SMM), and operating system (OS), is not allowed to access
or tamper with the code/data of an initialized enclave.
Here, we briefly discuss the life cycle of an SGX enclave. The
detailed explanation and analysis of Intel SGX technology can be
found in Costan and Devadas [7]. SGX sets aside a memory region,
referred to as the Processor Reserved Memory (PRM). The CPU
2
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1.Racer                 13.49%
2.Beach Wagon    11.12%
3.Limousine           9.45%
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5.Cab                      5.00%
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1. Location
i. Yerba Buena Tunnel
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5. Car Configuration
i. A/C Temperature 72 °F
6. EXIF Metadata
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Figure 1: The Information Disclosure of Input Data in a Deep Learning Inference Pipeline
enforces memory access control of PRM to prevent any out-of-
enclave memory accesses. Enclave Page Cache (EPC) stores the
code and data of an enclave. The state of all pages of the EPC is
maintained in the Enclave Page Cache Map (EPCM). A user-mode
application can ask system software to create (ECREATE) an enclave.
In the loading stage, the untrusted system software requests CPU
to copy the code and data (EADD) into the EPC and assigns these
memory pages to an enclave. After all memory pages are loaded,
an enclave is initialized (EINIT) and the cryptographic hash of
the enclave content is finalized. Before provisioning any secrets
into an enclave, a client needs to initiate remote attestation [1]
to verify the trustworthy level of hardware and the hash of the
enclave’s contents. An application can only enter its enclave via
pre-defined function interfaces by executing a special instruction
(EENTER). If enclave code needs to invoke system calls, it should
exit (EEXIT) the enclave because ring 0 code is not allowed inside
an enclave. To serve interrupts, page faults, or VM exits, the CPU
needs to perform Asynchronous Enclave Exits (AEXs) to save the
CPU state and transfer control to a pre-specified instruction out
of the enclave. In SGX2 [34], Intel will support dynamic memory
management inside an enclave, which allows run-time changes to
enclave memory while maintaining the security properties.
3 MOTIVATION
Without proper confidentiality protection, input data to the cloud-
based model serving systems might disclose user-specific sensitive
and private information. We investigate the life cycles of input data
instances in the deep learning image classification pipelines and in-
tend to identify the potential places where information might leak.
We give a motivating example in Figure 1 to empirically demon-
strate such information disclosures. We feed this picture 2 into
a 1000-class image classification system with a ConvNet model
trained on the ImageNet dataset. The output of the system is the
top-5 prediction class scores of the picture.
Here we present the potential information disclosures that may
occur in the deep learning inference pipelines. Thereafter, we de-
scribe the security principles our system needs to achieve to prevent
each type of information disclosure respectively.
Information Disclosures in Original Inputs. A picture is worth
a thousand words. If the inputs are fed into a DL system in unen-
crypted forms, adversaries can directly learn rich — sensitive and
2Image source: https://www.tesla.com/software
private — information. For this specific example, it is obvious that
this photo was taken when someone was driving a vehicle through
a tunnel. Based on the map and GPS location
  1 displayed on the
touchscreen, we can infer that this car was in the Yerba Buena
Tunnel, which is part of the San Francisco-Oakland Bay Bridge. We
can also learn from the red arrow on the map that the driver was
driving east from San Francisco to Oakland. The night mode of the
map indicates the picture was taken after the sunset. In addition,
the steering wheel emblem
  2 reveals that this vehicle is a Tesla.
The digital speedometer
  3 on the dashboard tells us the speed
at the time was 53 miles/hour. We can also obtain more personal
information about the driver from the album list
  4 of the media
player and the car settings
  5 on the touchscreen. Furthermore, if
the picture’s EXIF meta-data are not carefully eliminated, we may
also retrieve the GPS coordinates, the original date and time when
the picture was taken, the device type, and all camera configura-
tions from the EXIF, which may disclose more private information
about the user. Therefore, we define the first security principle to
prevent information disclosures in the original inputs.
Security Principle I
Original inputs should not be revealed in the public cloud
without proper protection.
InformationDisclosures in Intermediate Representations.A
deep learning inference procedure extracts feature representations
layer by layer. The process can be formulated as a composite trans-
formation function that maps raw inputs to outputs. Each hidden
layer performs its own transformation as a sub-function and gener-
ates an intermediate representation (IR) as an output. A transforma-
tion at each hidden layer helps converge the IRs towards the final
outputs. Based on the research efforts in understanding the internal
mechanisms of DNNs[44, 53, 54], for an image classification DNN,
the shallow layers respond more to low-level photographic infor-
mation (such as edges, corners, and contours, of the original inputs).
In contrast, deep layers represent more abstract and class-specific
information related to the final outputs.
Mapping these insights to the security domain, IRs computed out
of shallow and deep layers may disclose different input information
depending on adversaries’ capability. We summarize three types of
information disclosures in IRs as follows:
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(I) Explicit Disclosure. IRs computed out of shallow layers still
bestow low-level photographic information of the original inputs.
Thus, it is straightforward for humans, acting as adversaries, to
understand the IRs by projecting them to pixel space. For example,
in Figure 1, by examining the contents of the IR images out of
shallow layers, adversaries are able to collect similar amount of
information (though with limited information loss) if compared
with viewing the original input directly. We consider that such IRs
at shallow layers explicitly disclose the information of the original
inputs. Therefore, we derive the second security principle intending
to prevent the explicit information disclosure in IRs.
Security Principle II
IRs that are similar to the original inputs should not be
revealed in the public cloud without proper protection.
By progressing towards deeper layers, the projected IR images
in pixel space are not directly comprehensible by humans. The
information of the original inputs is transformed into high-level
features and is encoded via preceding layers as an encoder function.
However, the information is still preserved within IRs and is crucial
for final classification decisions. If adversaries can obtain both IRs
and the preceding model parameters, they can still implicitly divulge
sensitive information of the original inputs by exploiting Input
Reconstruction [9, 33] or Model Interpretation [2, 42, 45, 46] tech-
niques. We analyze both types of implicit disclosures respectively
in detail as follows.
(II) Implicit Disclosure via Input Reconstruction. We consider that
adversaries intend to reconstruct the original inputs from the IRs.
The general input reconstruction problem in deep neural networks
can be defined as follows: the representation function at layer i of
a given DNN is Φ : Rw×h×c 7→ Rd , wherein Rw×h×c is the input
space of a specific DNN and Rd is the output space for the IRs.
This process transforms the input x to Φ(x;θΦ) and θΦ represents
the model parameters of the first i layers. Given an IR = Φ(x;θΦ),
adversaries tend to compute an approximated inverse function ϕ−1
to generate x˜ = ϕ−1(IR) that minimizes the distance between x
and x˜. In practice, in order to derive ϕ−1, adversaries need to have
either white-box [33] or black-box [9] access to Φ.White-box access
means that adversaries need to retrieve the model parameters θΦ,
while black-box access means that adversaries need to query Φ
and generate input-IR pairs. The pairs can be further utilized to
approximate a surrogate inverse model ϕ−1.
(III) Implicit Disclosure via Model Interpretation. Instead of recon-
structing the original inputs, adversaries can also exploit the Model
Interpretation techniques, e.g., Deconv [54], Guided Backpropa-
gation [46], LRP [2], CAM [57], Grad-CAM [42], to interpret the
numerical values in IRs. The attack strategy is to connect features
in IRs to specific input attributions. Once such feature attribution or
interpretation is established, it can be generalized to infer sensitive
properties for future inputs. For example, some specific neurons
may only be activated by a special attribution in the input, e.g., the
steering wheel in Figure 1. If adversaries can confirm the connec-
tion between a steering wheel (as an input attribution) with a set
of activated neurons, they can infer whether future inputs have
the “steering wheel” attribution by only checking the feature map
activation.
Similar as the information disclosure via Input Reconstruction,
interpreting the numerical values in IRs also requires white-box
access to the model parameters. Thus, we can derive the third
security principle for both cases above.
Security Principle III
Model parameters for generating IRs should not be re-
vealed or allowed to be queried in the public cloud without
proper protection.
InformationDisclosures in Semantic ClassMapping. The last
place that might disclose the input information is at the exit of the
deep learning inference pipeline. The semantic class mapping of
a classifier leaks categorical information of the input. From the
top-5 prediction results (racer, beach wagon, limousine, sports car, or
cab, with different probability scores), we can clearly infer that this
picture is highly related to a vehicle, without viewing the original
input. Therefore, IRs can be deciphered via forward propagation if
models’ semantic class labels are left unprotected. To prevent the
information disclosure at semantic mapping, we derive the fourth
security principle.
Security Principle IV
Semantic labels of models should not be revealed in the
public cloud without proper protection.
In summary, information disclosures of user input data might
happen at multiple stages in a deep learning inference pipeline,
such as data entrance, feature extraction, and semantic class map-
ping. The design of our system should take all the derived security
principles into consideration to prevent potential information leak-
age.
4 THREAT MODEL
In our threat model, the goal of adversaries is to uncover the con-
tents of the user inputs submitted to deep learning image clas-
sification services. We consider that adversaries have the access
the cloud machines that serve DL models. This can be achieved
in multiple ways. For example, adversaries may exploit zero-day
vulnerabilities to penetrate and compromise the system software
of the cloud server. Insiders, such as cloud administrators, can also
retrieve and leak data from the servers on purpose. Data can be
in the form of files on disks or snapshots of physical memory. We
assume that adversaries understand the format of the files stored
on disks and they are able to locate and extract structured data (of
their interest) from memory snapshots.
We assume that service users trust SGX-enabled processor pack-
ages and adversaries cannot break into the perimeters of CPU
packages to track the code execution and data flow at the processor
level. We do not intend to address the side channel attacks against
Intel SGX in this paper. We expect that SGX firmware has been
properly upgraded to patch recently disclosed micro-architectural
vulnerabilities, e.g., Foreshadow[52] and SGXPectre[6], and the
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in-enclave code has been examined to be resilient to side channel
attacks.
We assume that the DL models to be deployed in the cloud are
trained in a secured environment and the model parameters are
not leaked to adversaries during model training. Users’ devices that
submit prediction requests are not compromised by adversaries.
The keys of service users are properly protected and inaccessible
by adversaries. Securing training process and protecting end-point
user devices are out of the scope of this paper.
5 TERNARY MODEL PARTITIONING
Based on the four security principles derived in Section 3, we devise
a Ternary Model Partitioning strategy to mitigate potential infor-
mation disclosures in deep learning inference pipelines. The key
idea is to partition each model into three functional components,
i.e., a FrontNet, a BackNet, and a Semantic Class Mapping Unit.
PartitioningMechanism.We choose a partitioning layer i where
i ∈ [1,n) in an n-layer DNN. The FrontNet includes layer 1 → i
and the BackNet includes the following layers. The function for
FrontNet can be represented as Φ : Rw×h×c 7→ Rd . IR = Φ(x;θΦ) =
FiFi−1...F1(x) and its output IR is the intermediate representation
computed out of a FrontNet. The function λ for a BackNet is y =
λ(IR;θλ) = FnFn−1...Fi+1(IR), in which IR is the input. The final
output y of a BackNet is a probability vector. The top-k entries are
extracted from y and are mapped with a set of user-defined class
labels L. This label matching process is conducted in the Semantic
Class Mapping Unit.
Use Case. Service users first partition their to-be-deployed models
locally. They can designate that the FrontNet and Semantic Class
Mapping Unit should be enclosed within a secure enclave in the
cloud, whereas the BackNet can run out of the enclave to benefit
from hardware acceleration. Thus, they can encrypt both the Front-
Net submodel and labels with their secret keys and provision them
to the cloud. The encrypted FrontNet and labels are only allowed to
be loaded and decrypted after the enclave initialization and remote
attestation. At runtime, service users can submit encrypted inputs
to the online prediction service and the inputs are only allowed
to be decrypted within the enclave. The semantic class mapping
is also conducted within the enclave and the final classification
results are sealed before returning back to users.
Revisiting Security Principles. We need to check whether the
Ternary Model Partitioning strategy can satisfy all four security
principles we defined in Section 3. Apparently, we satisfy Security
Principle I because service users only submit encrypted inputs to
the cloud. Enclave’s memory encryption mechanism can prevent
the information leakage of the original inputs. We can also achieve
Security Principle III because the model parameters of the FrontNet,
which generates the IRs that will be passed to the BackNet, are
enclosed within secure enclaves. Adversaries cannot retrieve the
FrontNet parameters as they are encrypted out of enclave. Further-
more, we adopt the Galois Counter Mode (AES-GCM) to authenti-
cate the encrypted inputs. Thus, we can prevent adversaries from
querying the FrontNet as a black-box. Therefore, we can effectively
eliminate the attack surface for exploiting the Input Reconstruc-
tion and Model Interpretation methods. Our design also satisfies
IR1 IR2 IR3 IRn-1 IRn
Input
IR Validation Network (IRValNet)
IR Generation Network (IRGenNet)
L1 L2
L3 Lm
L1 L2 L3 Ln
…
…
L4
Figure 2: The Architecture of the Neural Network Assess-
ment Framework
Security Principle IV because the Semantic Class Mapping Unit is
conducted within the boundary of enclaves. Adversaries cannot
decipher the semantic meanings of the probability vector as the
labels have already been protected.
By now, the only missing piece is whether our design can ful-
fill the requirement of Security Principle II. This also determines
how many layers we need to include in the FrontNet, which is
model-specific. To translate the Security Principle II in the context
of Ternary Model Partitioning, we need to find a partitioning layer
satisfying the following property: the IRs generated after this layer
are no longer similar to the original inputs. In order to address this
problem, we develop a Neural Network Assessment Framework for
service users to automatically find the optimal partitioning layers
for different DL model architectures.
5.1 Neural Network Assessment Framework
The key intuition behind our Neural Network Assessment Frame-
work is that if IRs retain similar visual contents as the original input,
they will be classified into similar categories under the same oracle
DNN. By measuring the similarity between the classification prob-
ability vectors, we can quantitatively determine whether a specific
IR is similar to its original input.
In Figure 2, we present the dual-neural-network architecture of
our Neural Network Assessment Framework. We submit an input x
to the IR Generation Network (IRGenNet) and generate IRi where
i ∈ [1,n]. We place the DL model that is to be deployed in the public
cloud as the IRGenNet to generate IRs. Each IRi contains multiple
feature maps after passing layer i (Li ). Then we project feature
maps to IR images and submit them to the IR Validation Network
(IRValNet), which acts as an oracle to inspect the IR images. The
IRValNet can have different model architecture/weights from the
IRGenNet. We use the DenseNet Model[21], which is known for
its high accuracy in image classification, as the oracle IRValNet.
The output of the IRValNet is a N -dimensional (N is the number of
classes) probability vector with class scores.
We define dist[x, IRi] to quantify the similarity between x and IRi.
We use Kullback-Leibler (KL) divergence to measure the similarity
of classification probability distributions for both x and IRi. At each
layer i , we select the IR image having the minimum KL divergence
(DKL) with the input x: ∀j ∈ [1, d(Li)], where d(Li) is the depth of
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the output tensor of layer i .
dist[x, IRi] = minj (DKL(F ∗(x,θ ) | | F ∗(IRij,θ )))
= minj (
N∑
k=1
F ∗(x,θ )[k ] log
F ∗(x,θ )[k ]
F ∗(IRij,θ )[k ]
), (1)
where F ∗(·,θ ) is the representation function of IRValNet. To
determine the optimal partitioning layer for each neural network,
we also computeDKL(F ∗(x,θ ) | | µ)where µ ∼ U {1,N }, the discrete
uniform distribution of the probability vector, and N is the number
of classes. This represents that adversaries have no prior knowledge
of x before obtaining IRs and consider that xwill be classified to any
class with equal chance. We use it as the baseline for comparison.
Thereafter, we compute ∀i ∈ [1,n], δi = dist[x, IRi]DKL (F ∗(x,θ ) | | µ) . We can
choose to partition at layer i , if and only if∀t ∈ [i,n], δt > 1. This iff
condition is important because KL divergence scores may fluctuate,
especially in the situation of skip connections. We will elaborate
further about this interesting phenomenon in our DenseNet [21]
case study in Section 8.2.
In summary, service users can leverage our Neural Network
Assessment Framework to analyze their deep learning models be-
fore deployment and automatically determine the optimal Front-
Net/BackNet partitioning. Thus, we can satisfy the Security Princi-
ple II to mitigate explicit information disclosure in IRs.
6 MODEL SERVING SYSTEM DESIGN
The service users can conduct the model partitioning on their lo-
cal machines and provision the partitioned models to the cloud
providers. In this section, we describe the system design of YerbaBuena
in the cloud and demonstrate the workflow of establishing a model
serving service.
6.1 Partitioned Deep Learning Inference
We adopt the TEE technology to enable isolated execution for
security-sensitive computation in deep learning inference.We choose
to use Intel SGX [35] as the TEE in our research prototype, but our
approach in principle can also be generalized to other TEEs[4, 27].
With the protection of the memory access control mechanism and
memory encryption engine (MEE) of SGX, all non-enclave accesses
from privileged system software or other untrusted components
of systems will be denied. In order to protect the secrecy of user
inputs, we enforce enclaved execution on the following three stages
in a deep learning inference pipeline:
Enclaved Entrance Control. The raw inputs contain all the sen-
sitive information and users should not upload them to the cloud
model serving system in plaintext. We allow service users to sub-
mit encrypted inputs. We establish an SGX enclave and load the
encrypted inputs into this enclave. The enclave can attest to remote
parties (i.e., the service users) that it is running on top of a trusted
hardware platform with legitimate code/data. After finishing the
remote attestation with the enclave, users can provision the keys
for input decryption directly into the enclave via a secure commu-
nication channel. The user inputs will only be decrypted within the
enclave and are invisible to the external computing stacks. Further-
more, we leverage AES-GCM to achieve authenticated encryption.
Thus, we can authenticate legitimate end users and verify the in-
tegrity of the user inputs.
Enclaved FrontNet Computation.We let service users partition
their proprietary DL models before deploying them to the cloud.
Each partitioned model consists of a FrontNet and a BackNet. We
allow service users to submit encrypted FrontNets and plaintext
BackNets to the model serving system. Same as the user inputs, we
also require FrontNet to be decrypted only within the enclave with
the key provisioned by the service user.
We leverage the enclave to keep the FrontNet model parame-
ters in confidence. Otherwise, adversaries can exploit the exposed
FrontNet via back-propagation to reconstruct original inputs from
IRs [9, 33] or interpret the semantic meanings of IRs [2, 42, 45, 46].
In addition, as we authenticate legitimate user inputs through AES-
GCM, we can further renderModel Stealing Attacks[49] ineffective.
For the adversaries who tend to treat the enclave as a black-box
service and query to build a surrogate FrontNet model, they need
to encrypt their inputs with the proper symmetric keys from the
legitimate end users. Assuming that end users’ keys are not leaked,
we can deny serving these illegitimate requests that fail the in-
tegrity check and prevent the leakage of in-enclave FrontNetmodel
information.
Enclaved Semantic Class Mapping. The class labels of a DNN
are used to decipher the final probability vector output. However,
this class mapping procedure leaks the object type information
of the original inputs. In our design, we allow service users to
submit encrypted class labels, which are decrypted only within
the same enclave. We enforce the enclaved execution for the final
class mapping function to mitigate the object information leakage
of the original inputs. Furthermore, by controlling both ends of a
deep learning inference pipeline, we can effectively mitigate service
abusing attacks. The adversaries can no longer generate input-label
pairs to infer sensitive attributions within the inputs.
6.2 Workflow
We summarize the workflow of YerbaBuena by explaining the
steps in Figure 3 and the corresponding pseudo-code in Algorithm 1.
In this case, the service user provides a partially-encrypted pre-
trained model (with FrontNet encrypted and BackNet in plaintext)
and an encrypted label set to set up the online model serving system.
Thereafter, the user can request the service with encrypted inputs.
❶ First, the user partitions a pre-trained proprietary model into
a FrontNet and a BackNet. Then she can encrypt the FrontNet
with her symmetric model key. Afterward, the user uploads the
encrypted FrontNet and the plaintext BackNet to the model serving
system in the cloud.
❷ Similarly, the user encrypts the class label set and uploads the
encrypted label set to the cloud server.
❸We initialize an Intel SGX enclave (init_sgx at line 19). After
initialization, we securely copies the encrypted FrontNet and labels
(sgx_load_mdl_lbl at line 20) into the enclave.
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Figure 3: The Workflow of an Image Classification Service via YerbaBuena
Algorithm 1 Partitioned Deep Learning Inference
Input: fn_enc ▷ Encrypted FrontNet sub-model
bn ▷ BackNet sub-model
lbl_enc ▷ Encrypted model labels
img_enc ▷ Encrypted image input
clt ▷ Client key provisioning server address
k ▷ Number of returned predictions
1: ############## Within SGX Enclave ##############
2: function sgx_load_enc_mdl_lbl (fn_enc, lbl_enc, clt)
3: tls← sgx_attestation (quote, clt)
4: model_key, img_key ← sgx_get_keys (clt, tls)
5: fn← sgx_verify_dec (fn_enc, model_key)
6: lbl← sgx_verify_dec (lbl_enc, model_key)
7: frontnet ← sgx_load_dnn (fn)
8: function sgx_inf_enc_img (img_enc)
9: img ← sgx_verify_dec (img_enc, img_key)
10: ir ← sgx_model_inf (frontnet, img)
11: return ir
12: function sgx_class_mapping (pv_k)
13: result ← sgx_mapping (lbl, pv_k)
14: enc_result ← sgx_enc (img_key, result)
15: return enc_result
16:
17: ############## Out of SGX Enclave ##############
18: function initialize_enclave (fn_enc, bn, lbl_enc, clt)
19: eid ← init_sgx ()
20: sgx_load_enc_mdl_lbl (eid, fn_enc, lbl_enc, clt)
21: backnet ← load_dnn (bn)
22: return eid, backnet
23: function inf_enc_img (eid, img_enc, k, clt)
24: ir ← sgx_inf_enc_img (eid, img_enc)
25: pv ← model_inf (backnet, ir)
26: enc_result ← sgx_class_mapping (eid, top (pv, k))
27: return enc_result
❹ The end user and the SGX enclave need to perform remote
attestation[1].3 The detailed description of the standard attesta-
tion protocol can be found in an example[25] provided by Intel.
3Due to the licensing procedure for registering SGX enclave code and the prerequisites
for using the Intel Attestation Server (IAS), we currently skip this step and instantiate
a TLS session directly between the end user and the enclave.
After remote attestation, a secure Transport Layer Security (TLS)
communication channel is created and the end user can provision
symmetric keys (sgx_get_keys at line 4) directly into the enclave
in the cloud.
❺ Inside the enclave, we verify the integrity of both the model
and the labels by checking their AES-GCM authentication tags, and
decrypt the FrontNet model (sgx_verify_dec at line 5) and the
labels (sgx_verify_dec at line 6) with the provisioned symmetric
key from the end user. Then we can build a deep neural network
based on the FrontNet (sgx_load_dnn at line 7) within the enclave
and the BackNet (load_dnn at line 21) out of the enclave.
❻We allow the users to upload their encrypted input data. Sim-
ilarly, we copy the encrypted input into the enclave and decrypt
them after authentication (sgx_verify_dec at line 9).
❼ Within the enclave, we pass the decrypted input into the
FrontNet model (sgx_model_inf at line 10) and generate the IR.
❽ The generated IR is securely copied out of the enclave through
a controlled channel of SGX. We pass the IR into the BackNet
model and get the probability vector (model_inf at line 25) for data
prediction. This vector is an N -dimensional vector that represents
a probability distribution over N different possible classes.
❾We extract the top-k entries and pass them into the enclave to
find themapping for their semantic class labels (sgx_class_mapping
at line 26). The mapped results are encrypted (sgx_enc at line 14)
with the prior symmetric key provisioned by the user. The en-
crypted result is returned back to the user.
7 IMPLEMENTATION
We build our research prototype YerbaBuena based on Dark-
net[40], which is an open source neural network implementation in
C and CUDA. We also implement the Neural Network Assessment
Framework to measure the information leakage of IRs at differ-
ent layers. It can guide end users to determine, for each specific
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deep learning model, the optimal number of layers to include in a
FrontNet and run within an enclave. In addition, we port the code
from the mbedtls-SGX[55], which is an mbedtls-based implemen-
tation of the TLS protocol suite supporting Intel SGX, to enable
TLS communication for key provisioning in YerbaBuena. In total,
we add 23,333 SLOC in C and 474 SLOC in Python for the system
development.
8 EVALUATION
In this section, we first conduct a qualitative security analysis tar-
geting adversaries with different adversarial purposes. Thereafter,
we leverage the Neural Network Assessment Framework to guide
the partitioning of three ImageNet-based deep learning models.
For each partitioned model, we also study the workload allocation
based on low-level floating point operations (FLOPs) to see the
proportion of computation that can be delegated to run out of en-
claves. Finally, we measure the inference performance overhead by
enclosing different numbers of layers in the enclave.
8.1 Security Analysis
Here we consider two hypothetical adversaries, A1 and A2. They
tend to uncover the contents of the original input x after obtaining
x’s IRs out of the enclave. We consider both adversaries have no
prior knowledge of input x, but they have different attack strategies:
A1 intends to reconstruct the original inputs from the exposed IRs
and A2 tries to infer the attribution information belonging to the
inputs throughModel Interpretation methods.
Input Reconstruction Attacks (A1). Here we qualitatively re-
view two representative Input Reconstruction techniques for deep
neural networks, analyze the requirements or preconditions for
these research works, and demonstrate that we can protect the data
confidentiality of user inputs from powerful adversaries equipped
with these techniques.
In Mahendran and Vedaldi[33], the authors proposed a gradi-
ent descent based approach to reconstructing original inputs by
inverting the IRs. Following the formal description of the input re-
construction problem in Section 3, the objective of their approach is
to minimize the loss function, which is the Euclid distance between
Φ(x) and IR. Considering that Φ should not be uniquely invertible,
they restrict the inversion by adding a regularizer to enforce natural
image priors.
The research by Dosovitskiy and Brox[9] has a similar goal of
inverting the IRs to reconstruct the original inputs. The major
difference is that they do not manually define the natural image
priors, but learn the priors implicitly and generate reconstructed
images with an up-convolutional neural network. They involve
supervised training to build the up-convolutional neural network,
in which the input is the intermediate representation Φ(x) and the
target is the input x. Thus, A1 needs to collect the training pairs
{Φ(x), x}.
In our design, the FrontNet models are encrypted by users and
are only allowed to be decrypted inside SGX enclaves. Assume
A1 tends to use Mahendran and Vedaldi’s approach[33] for recon-
struction, the representation function Φ, which is equivalent to
the FrontNet in our case, is not available in plaintext out of the
enclave. Thus, we can prevent A1 from conducting optimization
to compute both ϕ−1 and x˜. In addition, we can also prevent the
adversaries from querying the online FrontNet as a black-box ser-
vice. The reason is that we use AES-GCM to enable authenticated
encryption. The enclave code can deny illegitimate requests, whose
authentication tags cannot be verified correctly with users’ sym-
metric keys. Therefore,A1 cannot generate training pairs by using
Dosovitskiy and Brox’s approach[9] to build the up-convolutional
neural network. Without the up-convolutional neural network,A1
cannot reconstruct the original inputs either.
Input Attributions Inference Attacks (A2). All the Model In-
terpretation methods [2, 42, 46, 54, 57] require back-propagation
through the DL model to create connections between inputs and
IRs. In our design, we always keep the FrontNet within a secure
enclave. Therefore, we can effectively eliminate the possibility for
A2 to decipher the semantic meaning of these numerical numbers
within the IRs. In addition, we also place the final class mapping
within the enclave and only send the encrypted prediction results
to end users. Thus, we also mitigate the information leakage of
predicted classes for the original inputs too.
8.2 Partitioning and Workload Analysis
As an empirical study, we use our Neural Network Assessment
Framework to determine the optimal partitioning layers for three
ImageNet-level deep neural networks, i.e.,Darknet ReferenceModel
(17 layers), Extraction Model (28 layers), and DenseNet Model (306
layers)[21]. Based on the partitioning results, we further analyze the
workload allocation after partitioning to measure the computation
that can be out-sourced to benefit from DL-accelerated hardware.
Darknet Reference Model. This is a relatively small neural net-
work for ImageNet classification. Its number of parameters is ap-
proximately 1/10 of AlexNet[28], while this model still retains the
same prediction performance (top-1: 61.1% and top-5: 83.0%) com-
pared to AlexNet.
To determine the optimal partitioning layer for this model, we
compare the KL divergence ranges of all layers with the discrete
uniform distribution. In Figure 7, we present the KL ranges (black
columns) for the IR images of all layers (except the last three layers,
i.e., average pooling, softmax, and cost layers, which do not generate
IR images). For example, at layer 1 the minimum KL divergence is
3.08 and the maximum is 9.27. The lower the KL divergence score,
the more similar it is to the original input. We also highlight the
line for the KL divergence of the discrete uniform distribution with
regard to the original input x. This KL divergence score is 3.00.
We can find that after layer 4, the minimum KL divergence scores
surpass the line of discrete uniform distribution’s KL. This indicates
that exposing IRs after layer 4 to adversaries does not reveal more
information of the original input compared to any image classified
to a uniform distribution. Thus end users can choose to partition
the network at layer 4 and enclose them as a FrontNet to run within
an enclave.
To demonstrate that the model assessment result is consistent
with human perception, we select the IR images that have the
minimum KL divergence scores at the first five layers and display
them in Figure 4. For example, for layer 1, the IR image with the
minimum KL divergence to the original input is generated by its
7th filter. We can find that, the IR images for this specific model
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(a) Layer 1: Conv (b) Layer 2: MaxPool (c) Layer 3: Conv (d) Layer 4: MaxPool (e) Layer 5: Conv
Figure 4: The List of IR Images with Minimum KL Divergence at Each Layer — Darknet Reference Model
(a) Layer 1: Conv (b) Layer 2: MaxPool (c) Layer 3: Conv (d) Layer 4: MaxPool (e) Layer 5: Conv
Figure 5: The List of IR Images with Minimum KL Divergence at Each Layer — Extraction Model
(a) Layer 4: Conv (b) Layer 5: Route (c) Layer 21: Conv (d) Layer 59: Conv (e) Layer 205: Conv
Figure 6: The List of IR Images with Minimum KL Divergence at Each Layer — DenseNet Model
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of All Layers — Darknet Reference Model
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Figure 8: Normalized Cumulative FLOPs — Darknet Refer-
ence Model
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Figure 10: Normalized Cumulative FLOPs — Extraction
Model
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Figure 11: KL Divergence for Intermediate Representations of All Layers — DenseNet Model
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Figure 12: Normalized Cumulative FLOPs — DenseNet Model
retain less and less photographic information of the original inputs
when progressing towards deeper layers. From the adversary’s
perspective, it becomes more difficult to reconstruct the original
inputs if he can only obtain IRs generated by deeper layers running
out of enclave.
In addition, we also calculate the workloads of FLOPs for each
layer and display the normalized cumulative FLOPs in Figure 8.
Based on the partitioning decision above, we can enclose the first
four layers into an enclave (shown as the blue box), which comprises
only 20.88% of the whole workload. The remaining 79.12%workload
can still benefit from out-of-enclave hardware DL acceleration.
Extraction Model. Compared to the Darknet Reference Model,
the Extraction Model is deeper and can achieve higher prediction
accuracy (top-1: 72.5% and top-5: 90.0%).
We present the KL ranges for all layers in Figure 9. We can
observe a similar phenomenon that after Layer 3, the KL divergence
score ranges exceed the KL divergence of uniform distribution.
Thus the safe partitioning point for this neural network can be
at Layer 3. We also display the IR images with the minimum KL
divergence scores for the first five layers in Figure 5. We can find
that adversaries may still observe residual private information of
the original input from the IR images at Layer 1 and 2. This is
consistent with the quantitative analysis, which shows a subset of
IR images before layer 3 have lower KL divergence scores than the
uniform distribution.
As demonstrated in Figure 10, these three-layer enclaved execu-
tion only comprises 10.9% of the whole workload. The remaining
89.1% workload can be out-sourced to run out of enclaves.
DenseNet Model. In classical ConvNet architectures, each layer
obtains the input only from its precedent layer. However, with the
increase of network depth, it may lead to the vanishing gradient
problem[3, 14]. To address this issue, researchers introduced short
paths cross layers to make it practical to train very deep neural
networks. The authors of the DenseNet[21] introduced the neu-
ral network topology with DenseBlocks. Within each DenseBlock,
each layer obtains inputs from all preceding layers and also trans-
fers its own IRs to all subsequent layers. Between two adjacent
DenseBlocks, it contains transitional layers to adjust the IR’s size.
We find that the information disclosure properties of such special
model structures, i.e., DenseBlocks and densely connected layers,
can be consistently quantified via KL divergence analysis.
We show the KL divergence scores in Figure 11. The DenseNet
Model has four DenseBlocks. In each DenseBlock, the minimum KL
divergence scores plummet regularly every two layers. The reason
behind this phenomenon is that there exist route layers (after every
two consecutive convolutional layers) that receive inputs from all
preceding layers in the same DenseBlock. For example, the mini-
mum KL divergence of layer 4 (convolutional layer) is 5.24, while
at layer 5 (route layer) it drops to 2.27. Lower KL divergence scores
indicate higher similarity of two probability distributions. We can
obviously find that layer 5 (Figure 6b) preserves more information
of the original input than layer 4 (Figure 6a). This result implies
that we cannot simply partition in the middle of DenseBlock 1. The
IRs generated by deep layers within DenseBlock 1 can still reveal
original input’s information.
However, there is no densely connected path that crosses dif-
ferent DenseBlocks. Although there still exist fluctuations of KL
divergence scores in DenseBlock 2, the scores are significantly
larger than layers in DenseBlock 1. In Figure 6, we also display the
IR images with minimum KL divergence at all transitional layers
(layer 21, 59, and 205) between different DenseBlocks. Based on
the discrete uniform distribution KL divergence (3.00), the optimal
partition point is at layer 21 (the last layer of DenseBlock 1).
Similarly, based on Figure 12, such 21-layer DNN computation
accounts for 30.3% of the whole FLOP workload. We can assign the
remaining 285 layers to build the BackNet and run it out of the
enclave.
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SGX Enclaves (compiled with -O2)
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Figure 14: Performance Overhead of Running FrontNet in
SGX Enclaves (compiled with -Ofast)
8.3 Performance Evaluation
In the performance evaluation, we measure the performance over-
head for different system settings and indicate the constraint factors
in practice. By understanding the trade-off between security and
performance, end users can determine the level of security pro-
tection they tend to achieve and the corresponding performance
and usability cost they may have to pay. Our testbed is equipped
with an Intel i7-6700 3.40GHz CPU with 8 cores, 16GB of RAM, and
running Ubuntu Linux 16.04 with kernel version 4.4.0.
We measure the inference performance of YerbaBuena by pass-
ing testing samples through the Extraction Model. In the base case,
we load thewhole neural networkwithout using SGX and obtain the
average time for predicting these unencrypted images. To compare
with the base case, we partition the network, load multiple layers as
the FrontNet inside an SGX enclave and the following layers out of
the enclave, and obtain the same performance metrics. We need to
emphasize that both images and the FrontNetmodels are encrypted
in these cases and are decrypted at runtime inside SGX enclaves.
Due to the SGX memory limitation, we load up to 10 layers of
the Extraction Model into the enclave. We compiled YerbaBuena
with both gcc optimization level -O2 and -Ofast (with -O3 and
-ffast-math enabled) and present the normalized performance re-
sults in Figure 13 and 14 respectively. For each individual input, we
include the one-time overhead of enclave initialization in the per-
formance measurement. We distinguish the performance overhead
contributed by enclave initialization, in-enclave computation, and
out-of-enclave computation with bars of different colors. Layer 0 is
the base case with unencrypted inputs and all layers run out of the
SGX enclave.
For optimization level at -O2, we observe the performance over-
head increase from 12% for running one layer inside an enclave to
28% for ten layers. Initializations of enclaves contribute to the most
significant portion of the additional performance overhead. How-
ever, once the enclave is initialized, we observe that an inference
task within an SGX enclave has even lower performance overhead
as running out of the enclave. This ismainly due to the characteristic
of deep neural network computation, which is computing-intensive
and can benefit a lot from using the CPU cache and decrease the
rate to read and write the encrypted memory, which is considered
to be expensive in SGX. In the cloud scenario, we do not need
to initialize and tear down an enclave for each service request,
but can run one enclave as a long-time service to serve all client
requests. For optimization level at -Ofast, we observe that the
absolute time for enclave initialization is at the same level as in Fig-
ure 13. The in-enclave FrontNet computation causes 1.64x - 2.54x
overhead compared to the base case. The BackNet still conduct
inference computation at the same speed as the base case. We spec-
ulate that the slow down inside the enclave is due to the ineffective
-ffast-math flag for floating arithmetic acceleration. We expect
that in the future Intel will release optimized math library within
SGX enclave to further reduce the floating arithmetic overhead.
Compared to cryptographic schemes based approaches[13, 32,
37] and running whole neural network within a single enclave[38],
the performance overhead of YerbaBuenamakes online deep learn-
ing inference feasible and adaptable for production-level large-scale
deep neural networks. The out-of-enclave BackNet computation
can still benefit from hardware/compiler acceleration and we grant
end users the freedom to adjust network partitioning strategy to
satisfy their specific security and performance requirements.
9 DISCUSSION
Applicable Deep Learning Models. In addition to the widely de-
ployed deep learning models used for classification tasks, there also
exist some special information-preserving neural networks designed
for specific machine learning purposes. One representative case
is the AutoEncoder [20], which is used for efficient encoding, di-
mension reduction, and learning generative models. AutoEncoder
networks are trained to minimize the reconstruction errors be-
tween inputs and outputs. Thus, an AutoEncoder’s outputs may
contain similar sensitive information as its inputs. Our system can
be naturally extended to support confidentiality protection of Au-
toEncoder’s inputs. We need to partition each AutoEncoder neural
network into three sub-models, i.e., FrontNet, MiddleNet, and Back-
Net. Then we can enclose both the FrontNet and the BackNet into
an isolated enclave, as both ends of the AutoEncoder may generate
IRs similar to the original inputs. End users can use our Neural
Network Assessment Framework to determine the number of layers
assigned respectively for the FrontNet and the BackNet.
Compression of Deep Learning Models. There is also a line of
interesting researchworks on reducing the storage and computation
of deep neural networks without decreasing model accuracy. Den-
ton et al.[8] applied singular value decomposition (SVD) to reduce
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ConvNet computation. Han et al.[18] pruned redundant connec-
tions for models trained with ImageNet dataset without accuracy
loss, e.g., reduce the total number of parameters of AlexNet by a fac-
tor of 9x and VGG-16 by a factor of 13x. In Deep Compression [17],
the authors further combined pruning, trained quantization, and
Huffman coding to reduce the storage of neural networks by 35x
to 49x without affecting the accuracy. SqueezeNet[24] can achieve
AlexNet-level accuracy with 50x fewer parameters with 0.5 MB
model size. These works shed light on deploying production-level
deep neural networks on embedded systems and mobile computing
platforms. Our system can greatly benefit from their research out-
comes to reduce computation and memory footprints within SGX
enclaves, and further applying confidentiality protection to deeper
neural networks.
10 RELATEDWORK
In this section we list the research efforts that are closely related
to our work and highlight our unique contributions compared to
these works.
Cryptographic Schemes BasedMachine Learning.Most of the
existing privacy-preserving machine learning solutions are based
on cryptographic schemes, such as secure multi-party computation
(SMC), fully homomorphic encryptions (FHE)[12], etc. Solutions
based on SMC protect intermediate results of the computation when
multiple parties perform collaborative machine learning on their
private inputs. SMC has been used for several fundamental machine
learning tasks[10, 26, 31, 37, 50, 51]. Besides these protocol-based so-
lutions, recently researchers also propose to leverage cryptographic
primitives to perform deep learning inference. Gilad-Bachrach et
al.[13] proposed CryptoNets, a neural network model that makes
predictions on data encrypted by FHE schemes. This approach
protects the privacy of each individual input in terms of confiden-
tiality.MiniONN[32] is an approach that transforms existing neural
networks to an oblivious neural network that supports privacy-
preserving predictions.
Considering the significant performance overhead of using cryp-
tographic schemes, we propose to leverage Intel SGX technology
to securely execute deep neural network computation on the cloud
side. Hence we can protect the confidentiality of user inputs for
predictions and can defend against input reconstruction and input
attribution inference attacks.
Distributed Deep Learning. Shokri and Shmatikov[43] designed
a distributed privacy-preserving deep learning protocol by sharing
selective parameters and gradients for training deep neural network
in a differentially private way. Ossia et al.[39] proposed a distributed
machine learning architecture to protect the user’s input privacy.
Their framework consists of a feature extractor on the mobile client
side and a classifier on the server side. The server side performs
inference task on the dimension-reduced extracted features from
the mobile client. PrivyNet[30] is a splitting model deep learning
training approach. They reused layers of pre-trained models for
feature extraction on local machines and train the cloud neural
network for the learning tasks based on the feature representations
generated by the local neural network.
Different from their works, our approach leverages TEEs in the
cloud directly to guarantee the confidentiality of user inputs, class
labels, and the user-provisioned models. Thus, we significantly sim-
plify the client’s logic and relieve client devices, which are supposed
to have limited computing capacity and power usage restriction,
from heavyweight neural network computation. In addition, our ap-
proach does not involve transferring intermediate representations
through the network, thus eliminating the additional performance
overhead for dimension reduction or data compression.
SGX Applications. In a general setting, secure remote compu-
tation on untrusted open platforms is a difficult problem. Intel
developed SGX technology to tackle this problem by leveraging the
trusted hardware on remote machines. A set of new instructions
and memory access control have been added since the release of the
Intel 6th generation Skylake architecture. The general introduction
of SGX can be found in [35]. We can also find the technical details
about the SGX attestation and sealing mechanisms in [1], dynamic
memory allocation of SGX2 in [34], andMemory Encryption Engine
in [15]. We have also observed numerous innovative applications
leveraging security mechanisms of SGX from academia to industry
in recent years to address different research problems.
We have discussed and compared with recent research efforts[22,
23, 38] of employing SGX for privacy-preserving machine learning
tasks. To address the performance and capacity limitations of secure
enclaves, concurrent research by Tramèr and Boneh[48] explored
a similar “workload partitioning” methodology. They proposed to
outsource linear layers’ computation of DNNs to out-of-enclave
GPUs. Different from their approach, we employ a vertical layer-
wise partitioning strategy to exploit the intrinsic structural prop-
erties of deep learning models. These two partitioning strategies
are not in conflict and can be deployed together to further reduce
the performance overhead of enclaved inference computation with
confidentiality protection. MLCapsule [19] is another interesting
offline model deployment approach that executes model locally on
the client’s machine and protects the models’ secrecy with SGX en-
claves. Thus, they explore how to securely deploy server’s machine
learning workload to the client, while we investigate in a reverse
direction on how to out-source client’s computation to the server.
SGX has also been used for efficient two-party secure function
evaluation[16], private membership test[47], trustworthy remote
entity[29]. SGX technology is also widely researched in cloud sce-
narios. VC3[41] ran distributed MapReduce computation within
SGX enclaves on the cloud to keep the confidentiality of user’s code
and data. Opaque[56] was a distributed data analytics platform
introducing SGX-enabled oblivious relational operators to mask
data access patterns. SecureKeeper[5] provided an SGX-enhanced
ZooKeeper to protect the sensitive application data. HardIDX[11]
leveraged SGX to help search over encrypted data. Different from
the goals of these works, our work intends to protect the user input
confidentiality from being exposed in public cloud environments.
11 CONCLUSION
We systematically study the information disclosures in deep learn-
ing image classifiers and devise a Ternary Model Partitioning strat-
egy to mitigate input data exposure in deep learning inference
pipelines. To further help users determine the optimal partitioning
layers for their pre-trained models, we design a Neural Network
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Assessment Framework to automatically quantify layer-wise infor-
mation leakage for different neural network architectures. We have
also built YerbaBuena, an enclave-based model serving system
running on cloud infrastructures, to protect the confidentiality of
both user inputs along with user-specified deep neural network
layers and semantic class mapping. Security analysis demonstrates
our system can effectively neutralize input reconstruction and attri-
bution inference attacks, thus eliminating channels for adversaries
to reconstruct user inputs or reveal sensitive input properties.
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